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EU Recommendations and Judicial Review 
 
ECJ, 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16 P Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission 
 
Anthony Arnull* 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Article 292 TFEU provides that the Council, the Commission and, in some 
circumstances, the European Central Bank ‘shall adopt recommendations.’ The 
recommendation is one of the five types of legal act referred to in Article 288 TFEU. 
Like opinions, recommendations are described by that provision as having ‘no 
binding force’. They therefore lack the swagger of the regulation, the muscularity of 
the decision, the mystique of the directive. Yet the decision of the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of Justice in Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission,1 which 
concerned a challenge to the validity of a recommendation adopted by the 
Commission, revealed that there is more to recommendations than meets the eye. 
The contested recommendation was concerned with ‘principles for the 
protection of consumers and players of online gambling services and for the 
prevention of minors from gambling online.’2 After a preamble of 30 paragraphs, its 
first substantive provision stated: 
 
Member States are recommended to achieve a high level of protection for 
consumers, players and minors through the adoption of principles for online 
gambling services and for responsible commercial communications of those 
services, in order to safeguard health and to also minimise the eventual 
economic harm that may result from compulsive or excessive gambling. 
 
*University of Birmingham, UK. I am grateful to the editors for their comments. 
 
1 ECJ 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16 P EU:C:2018:79. 
2 Recommendation 2014/478, O.J. 2014 L 214/38. 
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Oddly for a measure having no binding force, the recommendation then stated that it 
‘does not interfere with the right of Member States to regulate gambling services’, as 
though this reflected an exercise of restraint by the Commission. 
After a section on definitions, the remainder of the recommendation 
comprised ten sections dealing respectively with information requirements; minors; 
player registration and accounts; player activity and support; time out and self-
exclusion; commercial communication; sponsorship; education and awareness; 
supervision; and reporting. 
The section on supervision invited Member States ‘to designate competent 
gambling authorities when applying the principles laid down in this Recommendation 
to ensure and monitor in an independent manner effective compliance with national 
measures taken in support of the principles set out in this Recommendation.’ The 
section on reporting invited Member States ‘to notify the Commission of any 
measure taken pursuant to this Recommendation by 19 January 2016…’ It also 
invited them ‘to collect reliable annual data for statistical purposes’ on a range of 
matters and to communicate them to the Commission by 19 July 2016. 
 
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE GENERAL COURT 
 
On 13 October 2014, Belgium brought an action before the General Court for the 
annulment of the contested recommendation under Article 263 TFEU.3 This was a 
bold step since the first paragraph of Article 263 expressly excludes 
recommendations from the class of acts which may be challenged in annulment 
proceedings. That exclusion is evidently connected with the failure of Article 288 to 
confer binding force on recommendations. Be that as it may, Belgium argued that the 
contested recommendation reflected an intention on the part of the Commission to 
harmonise the application to gambling of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and that it 
therefore constituted ‘a hidden directive.’4 It produced ‘indirect legal effects’5 
because the duty of sincere cooperation would require Member States to use their 
best endeavours to comply with it and national courts would have to take it into 
account where relevant. 
3 General Court 27 October 2015, Case T-721/14 Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission 
EU:T:2015:829. 
4 Ibid., para. 15. 
5 Ibid. 
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The General Court dismissed the action as inadmissible. It pointed out that 
‘any measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their form, which are intended to 
have binding legal effects, are regarded as actionable measures within the meaning 
of Article 263 TFEU…’6 In order to establish whether a measure was ‘capable of 
having legal effects’,7 it was necessary to examine its wording and context, its 
substance and the intention of its author. Although Article 288 made it clear that 
recommendations did not have binding force, the choice of form could not alter the 
nature of a measure. Therefore ‘the mere fact that the contested recommendation is 
formally designated as a recommendation and was adopted on the basis of Article 
292 TFEU cannot automatically rule out its classification as a challengeable act.’8 
The General Court noted that the contested recommendation was ‘worded 
mainly in non-mandatory terms.’9 This provided ‘a clear and specific indication’ that 
its content was ‘not intended to have binding legal effects…’10 It did not include ‘any 
explicit indication’ that the Member States were ‘required to adopt and apply the 
principles set out therein.’11 Moreover, the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission had agreed that it was not appropriate at this juncture to propose 
specific EU legislation to regulate online gambling. Although the recommendation 
had been published in the L series of the Official Journal, this had ‘no bearing on 
whether the act at issue is capable of having binding legal effects…’12 The same was 
true of the detailed nature of the principles set out in the recommendation.13 
The General Court acknowledged that the Court of Justice had held in 
Grimaldi14 that recommendations could not 
 
be regarded as having no legal effect. The national courts are bound to take 
recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to 
them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national 
6 Supra n. 3, para. 16, citing inter alia ECJ 31 March 1971, Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) 
EU:C:1971:32. 
7 Supra n. 3, para. 18. 
8 Ibid., para 20. 
9 Ibid., para. 21. 
10 Ibid., para. 24. 
11 Ibid., para. 32. 
12 Ibid., para. 40. 
13 Ibid., para. 72. 
14 ECJ 13 December 1989, Case C-322/88 Grimaldi EU:C:1989:646, para. 18. See A. Arnull, ‘The 
Legal Status of Recommendations’, 15 European Law Review (1990) p. 318. 
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measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to 
supplement binding Community provisions. 
 
However, that limited legal effect could not be enough to render recommendations 
reviewable, for that would be inconsistent with the terms of Article 263. For the same 
reason, claims based on the principle of conferral, institutional balance, effective 
judicial protection and fundamental rights were also rejected. An argument that the 
contested recommendation resulted ‘in unlawful harmonisation and liberalisation of 
the market in the online gambling sector’ was dismissed by the General Court as 
‘based on a manifestly incorrect reading of the recommendation.’15 
 
THE APPEAL TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
Belgium brought an appeal against the decision of the General Court before the 
Court of Justice. The Court of Justice declared that the purpose of Article 288 TFEU 
was ‘to confer on the institutions which usually adopt recommendations a power to 
exhort and to persuade, distinct from the power to adopt acts having binding force.’16 
It could not be established that a recommendation was reviewable under Article 263 
TFEU merely by showing that, although it did not produce binding legal effects, it 
contravened certain principles or procedural rules. 
The Court of Justice explained that ‘any provisions adopted by the institutions, 
whatever their form, which are intended to have binding legal effects are regarded as 
“challengeable acts” for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU…’17 Thus, an act entitled a 
recommendation which was intended to have binding legal effects would not 
constitute a genuine recommendation and would be open to review under Article 
263. Moreover, Article 267 TFEU gave the Court jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings ‘on the validity and interpretation of all acts of the EU institutions without 
exception…’18 None of this was of any assistance to the appellant, however, and the 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
15 Supra n. 3, para. 63. 
16 Supra n. 1, para. 26. 
17 Ibid., para. 31. 
18 Ibid., para. 44. 
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 On one level, the outcome of the case was not surprising. Articles 263 and 288 
TFEU are explicit. Indeed, the Belgian Government must have been advised in 
advance that its challenge was very unlikely to succeed. Why then did it go ahead? 
It is possible that Belgium objected to the content of the contested 
recommendation. While it would have been aware that the recommendation was not 
binding, it might have been reluctant simply to ignore it. Another possibility is that 
Belgium objected to the form of the contested recommendation, which might have 
left the uninitiated uncertain whether it was binding or not. 
Although the General Court described the contested recommendation as 
‘worded mainly in non-mandatory terms’,19 it did concede that certain provisions 
were in some language versions ‘drafted in more mandatory terms’.20 The versions 
concerned included those drawn up in Dutch and German, which are official 
languages of Belgium.21 Was Belgium perhaps concerned about the discrepancy 
between those versions and the version in French, another of its official languages, 
which used non-mandatory terminology throughout? 
Then there was the question of why the contested recommendation had been 
published in the L series of the Official Journal. The point may seem a trivial one, but 
presumably this did not happen by accident. It must have been the result of a 
deliberate choice. One is entitled to ask who made it and why. Was it perhaps 
intended to disguise the recommendation’s real status? 
These were among the issues considered by Advocate General Bobek in a 
detailed Opinion22 that concluded by recommending that the order of the General 
Court should be set aside and the case referred back to it for a decision on the 
merits. 
The Advocate General made two powerful opening points.23 The first was 
that, ‘in view of the changing legislative landscape of (not only) EU law, which is 
marked by a proliferation of various soft law instruments, access to the EU courts 
should be adapted in order to respond to those developments.’ The Court should, he 
said, recognise ‘the fact that there are norms generating significant legal effects that 
19 Ibid., para. 21 [emphasis added]. 
20 Ibid., para. 26. 
21 ECJ 12 December 2017, Opinion of A.G. Bobek, EU:C:2017:959, para. 139. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., para. 4. 
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find themselves beyond the binary logic of binding/non-binding legal rules.’ The 
second was that a normative instrument such as the contested act ‘that in the light of 
its logic, context, purpose and partially also language, can reasonably be seen as 
setting rules of behaviour, ought to be subject to judicial review, irrespective of the 
fact that it is somewhat disguised as a set of mere “principles” in a recommendation.’ 
Advocate General Bobek pointed out that, when the contested 
recommendation was adopted, it was accompanied by a Commission 
memorandum24 which stated:25 
 
A Recommendation is a non-binding instrument used by the European 
Commission to send a clear message to Member States as to what actions 
are expected to remedy a situation, while leaving sufficient flexibility at 
national level as to how to achieve this. By setting the objectives to be 
attained, it should act as a catalyst for the development of consistent 
principles to be applied throughout the European Union. 
 
The memorandum added: 
 
there is no sector specific EU legislation in the online gambling services 
sector and it was not considered appropriate to propose such specific 
legislation. Moreover, a Commission Recommendation can be adopted 
immediately whereas proposals for legislation would have to be adopted by 
the EU’s Council of Ministers and the European Parliament which can take 
time. 
 
The wording of the memorandum is striking. Although the Commission does not 
conceal the fact that recommendations are not binding, the reference to ‘sending a 
clear message to Member States’ suggests that there will be adverse consequences 
if they fail to do what is expected of them, thereby impeding the development of 
uniform principles. In fact, with the exception of the acknowledgement that 
recommendations are not binding, the remainder of the description of the 
recommendation given by the Commission could apply equally well to directives. 
24 The term ’memorandum’ does not appear in Art. 288 TFEU and has no technical meaning. 
25 Supra n. 21, para. 30 [emphasis added]. 
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From the perspective of the Commission, recommendations even have the 
advantage over directives of not requiring any involvement by other institutions. 
On the substance of the case, Advocate General Bobek took the view that the 
General Court had not interpreted the effects of the contested recommendation 
correctly. It had consequently failed to address properly the admissibility of the 
application. In the ERTA case,26 the Court of Justice had held that annulment 
proceedings should be available for the purpose of challenging ‘all measures 
adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have 
legal effects.’ In its subsequent case law, the Court of Justice had made it clear that, 
when deciding on the admissibility of an action for annulment, the substance of the 
contested measure was more important than its form. One of the problems with the 
ERTA test, however, was that over time it was ‘effectively becoming narrower and 
narrower’ and was ‘falling out of sync with the evolution of the EU’s normative 
landscape.’27 The Advocate General declared: ‘In a world where various instruments 
of soft law are, in fact, becoming much more numerous and significant than in 1971 
[when ERTA was decided], the conditions for standing and judicial review should 
react to such developments.’28 
Advocate General Bobek identified two particular challenges facing the ERTA 
test. One was ‘the rise of various forms of soft law that strictly speaking do not have 
binding force but at the same time generate legal effects...’ The other was that 
‘recommendations are in practice likely to generate a number of legal effects, often 
quite significant ones, on both the EU level as well as the national level…’29 The 
higher courts in a number of Member States, he said, had been opening up judicial 
review to include acts that were not strictly binding. This had happened where, for 
example, an act was perceived as effectively binding because it contained 
incentives, or when its author had the power to impose sanctions, or when it 
produced significant effects on its addressees. The Advocate General observed:30 
 
It appears that despite their diversity, both at the national as well as EU law 
levels, the various soft law instruments share the same key feature: they are 
26 Supra n. 6, paras. 39 and 42. 
27 Supra n. 21, para. 67. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., para. 80. 
30 Ibid., para. 36. 
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not binding in the traditional sense. They are a type of imperfect norm: on the 
one hand, they clearly have the normative ambition of inducing compliance on 
the part of their addressees. On the other hand, no instruments of direct 
coercion are attached to them. 
 
According to Advocate General Bobek, recommendations generally fitted that 
description. Although said to be non-binding, they could ‘generate considerable legal 
effects, in the sense of inducing certain behaviour and modifying normative reality. 
They are likely to have an impact on the rights and obligations of their addressees 
and third parties.’31 They were also ‘likely to be used in legal interpretation, in 
particular in order to give meaning to indeterminate legal notions contained in 
binding legislation.’32 They ‘could be used as more than just tools for advancing 
policies that are politically (lack of consensus) or legally (no specific powers to that 
effect) gridlocked. They could also potentially be used as a tool to circumvent the 
same legislative processes.’33 They might even pre-empt the legislative process by 
shaping 
 
the range of conceivable (acceptable) normative solutions for the future. If, 
based on a recommendation, a number of EU institutions or Member States 
already comply, those actors will, in the legislative process that may 
potentially follow, naturally promote the legislative solution that they had 
already embraced. In this way, the soft law of today becomes the hard law of 
tomorrow.34 
 
Advocate General Bobek therefore proposed a readjustment of the ERTA rule based 
on three factors. 
1. The first factor was ‘the degree of formalisation (does the EU measure take 
on the form of a legal act?) and of definitiveness of the measure (has it been 
adopted at the end, as the culmination of a consultation or, more generally, in 
a ‘soft-law making’ process?).’35 As far as the form of the act in question was 
31 Ibid., para. 88. 
32 Ibid., para. 91. 
33 Ibid., para. 93. 
34 Ibid., para. 95. 
35 Ibid., para. 116 [emphasis in the original]. 
8 
 
                                                          
concerned, to be reviewable ‘it must appear to be like a legal text so that it 
could be reasonably perceived as producing legal effects. In this respect, an 
act will appear to be a legal act if, for instance, it is divided into articles or at 
least sections, if it is published in the Official Journal (certainly in the L series, 
where legislation is supposed to be published).’36 
2. The second factor related ‘to the content and overall purpose of the contested 
act: how precise are the “obligations” contained therein? What is the general 
aim pursued?’37 
3. The third factor concerned enforcement. ‘Does the measure contain any clear 
and specific compliance, enforcement, or sanction mechanisms? Naturally, 
this does not aim only at direct enforcement, which is very unlikely to be 
present, but at indirect mechanisms or enforcement, both structural and 
institutional.’38 Structural compliance mechanisms might include ‘reporting, 
notification, monitoring, and supervision. Elements of peer pressure might 
also be of relevance, such as the publishing of performance tables, reports 
involving public naming and shaming, and so on.’39 
Finally, the Advocate General argued that the contested act would be likely to induce 
compliance if the adopting institution had the power to impose sanctions on the 
addressees in the same or related fields. 
Advocate General Bobek concluded that the contested recommendation went  
 
considerably beyond what might be expected from a document that simply 
recommends certain principles. In this specific case, it can indeed be argued 
that that Recommendation is bound to produce legal effects and that 
reasonable addressees are likely to modify their behaviour in order to comply, 
at least partially, with the Recommendation.40 
 
36 Ibid., para. 117. 
37 Ibid., para. 119. 
38 Ibid., para. 120 [emphasis in the original]. 
39 Ibid., para. 121. 
40 Ibid., para. 123. 
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He said that ‘the level of detail and precision of concrete provisions of the 
Recommendation is striking. Far from setting out mere “principles”, the 
Recommendation lays down rather clear and precise rules.’41 
Should the Court of Justice reject that approach in favour of a strict 
application of Article 263, Advocate General Bobek said that it should take that view 
to its logical conclusion. This would mean recognising that 
 
recommendations are neither binding, nor are they allowed to produce any 
legal effects. They accordingly cannot create any rights or obligations, for the 
Member States or for individuals. As far as the Member States are concerned, 
the principle of loyal and sincere cooperation cannot be used to start eroding 
that proposition, in whatever way. The Member States are fully entitled to 
entirely disregard the content of a recommendation without there being any 
possibility of direct or indirect sanctions.42 
 
It would also be necessary for the Court of Justice to revisit Grimaldi and state 
clearly that, while national courts were at liberty to take recommendations into 
account if they wished, they were under no obligation to do so. An act that was not 
binding could not impose obligations on national courts. 
 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS ITS CAKE AND EATS IT 
 
It is a matter of concern that the Court of Justice declined to follow the Opinion of 
Advocate General Bobek. Not only did it apply the conventional reading of the Treaty 
that he had so effectively dismantled, but it also failed to underline that 
recommendations produced no legal effects or to reverse Grimaldi. The outcome is 
patently inconsistent: recommendations cannot be the subject of annulment 
proceedings because they have no binding force but national courts are bound to 
take them into consideration. 
More generally, the decision of the Court of Justice disturbs the institutional 
balance by offering the Commission a way of circumventing the decision-making 
processes laid down by the Treaty. Instead of submitting a formal proposal which 
41 Ibid., para. 128. 
42 Ibid., para. 168. 
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might have to be amended to secure the approval of the Council or the European 
Parliament, the Commission may unilaterally issue recommendations in the 
knowledge that some Member States will comply with them and national courts will 
be required to take them into account. Moreover, third parties may sometimes 
consider themselves bound by recommendations. This may be because a 
recommendation may look like a binding act or contain apparently mandatory 
language or the third party does not wish to damage its standing in the eyes of the 
Commission. It seems self-evident that this sort of off-balance-sheet law-making is 
highly detrimental to the integrity of the Union legal order, particularly in the way it 
marginalises two of the three institutions mentioned in Article 10(2) TEU (the other is 
the European Council) presented as evidence of the Union’s democratic legitimacy. 
It is significant that Article 10(2) does not mention the Commission. 
There are two ways in which the Court of Justice could have avoided so 
perilous an outcome. It could have said that the contested act was not a true 
recommendation: it was too detailed; the use of mandatory language in some of the 
language versions threatened legal certainty; it was published in the L series of the 
Official Journal. It might then have been treated as an innominate act for the 
purposes of the ERTA line of case law. The Court of Justice stated in that case that 
what is now Article 263 TFEU ‘treats as acts open to review by the Court all 
measures adopted by the institutions which are intended to have legal force.’43 It 
went on to add that an action for annulment had to be available ‘in the case of all 
measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are 
intended to have legal effects.’44 As Advocate General Bobek pointed out, that test 
subsequently became somewhat stricter as the term ‘legal effects’ came to be 
replaced by ‘binding legal effects’, the term used by both the General Court and the 
Court of Justice in the Belgium case. Advocate General Bobek observed that binding 
legal effect was a much narrower category than legal effect.45 However, for present 
purposes, the Court could have found that the contested act satisfied the narrower 
test because of the ruling in Grimaldi that national courts were bound to take 
recommendations into consideration. It would have made no sense to exclude from 
43 ECJ, supra n. 6, para. 39 [emphasis added]. 
44 Ibid., para. 42 [emphasis added]. 
45 Supra n. 21, para. 73. 
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that rule a fictitious recommendation being treated as an innominate act for the 
purposes of the ERTA test. 
The drawback of the approach described in the previous paragraph is that it 
would have done little to discourage the (ab)use by the Commission of fictitious 
recommendations. A better approach would therefore have been to follow the 
second solution proposed by Advocate General Bobek and to deny 
recommendations any legal effect whatsoever. 
That the Court of Justice did not adopt either of those solutions is grim news 
for those who believe in the importance of judicial review in protecting the rule of law 
and individual rights. Having shut down access by private parties and out-sourced 
much of the responsibility for upholding their rights to the national courts of the 
Member States, there are now signs that the CJEU is taking a stricter approach to 
the notion of a reviewable act under Article 263 TFEU. 
The Belgium case is not an isolated example. In NF v European Council,46 the 
applicant sought the annulment of the so-called EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 
2016 designed to reduce irregular migration from Turkey to Greece. That statement 
attracted a wave of criticism on humanitarian grounds.47 Its central plank was that 
irregular migrants from Turkey seeking to enter Greece would be returned and that, 
for every migrant of Syrian nationality returned to Turkey, another Syrian would be 
resettled in the EU. 
The statement was published in the form of a press release, according to 
which the members of the European Council and their Turkish counterpart had met 
and the EU and Turkey had agreed that certain actions should be taken.48 As the 
General Court acknowledged, this ‘could, admittedly, imply that the representatives 
of the Member States of the European Union had acted…in their capacity as 
members of the “European Council” institution [sic]…’49 However, the General Court 
concluded that, ‘notwithstanding the regrettably ambiguous terms of the EU-Turkey 
46 General Court 28 February 2017, Case T-192/16 EU:T:2017:128. 
47 For an attempt to gain access to documents generated or received by the Commission containing 
legal advice and/or analysis of the legality of the statement and its implementation, see General Court 
7 February 2018, Case T-851/16 Access Info Europe v Commission EU:T:2018:69; P. Leino and D. 
Wyatt, ‘No public interest in whether the EU-Turkey refugee deal respects EU Treaties and 
international human rights?’, European Law Blog, 28 February 2018, 
europeanlawblog.eu/2018/02/28/no-public-interest-in-whether-the-eu-turkey-refugee-deal-respects-
eu-treaties-and-international-human-rights/, visited 18 April 2018. 
48 NF, supra n. 46, para. 54. 
49 Ibid., para. 56. 
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statement…it was in their capacity as Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States that the representatives of those Member States met with the Turkish Prime 
Minister on 18 March 2016 in the premises shared by the European Council and the 
Council…’50 The statement could not therefore be considered an act of the European 
Council. 
Was this outcome compatible with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (right to an effective remedy and a fair trial)? On this point, the General Court 
noted that Article 47 was ‘not intended to change the system of judicial review laid 
down by the Treaties…’51 The authority given for that proposition was the judgment 
of the Court of Justice in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council.52 That 
judgment refers to the Explanation on Article 47 of the Charter, which does indeed 
make this point. But let us be clear: the outcome was the result of a deliberate policy 
choice by the Court of Justice. The Explanations on the Charter53 are not themselves 
part of the Treaties and are merely required to be given ‘due regard’ when the 
Charter is applied.54 They state on their face that ‘they do not as such have the 
status of law’. The Court of Justice could have chosen a different path in Inuit and 
the General Court should have done so in NF, where some of the values on which 
the Union is said by Article 2 TEU to be founded were at stake. One can understand 
why the Court of Justice is so defensive about the prospect of Union accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights.55 
From a doctrinal point of view, the case law on the action for annulment is 
incoherent.56 The Court of Justice has frequently departed from the text of the 
Treaty. ERTA is arguably an example, indubitably so are Les Verts57 and 
Chernobyl58 (the latter case reversing the decision in Comitology59 delivered less 
than two years previously). Further departures, in Extramet60 and Codorniu,61 were 
necessary to deal with the chaotic state of the case law concerning the concept of a 
50 Ibid., para. 66. 
51 Ibid., para. 74. 
52 ECJ 3 October 2013, Case C-583/11 P EU:C:2013:625, para. 97. 
53 See O.J. 2007 C 303/17. 
54 Art. 6(1) TEU. 
55 See ECJ 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454. 
56 See A. Arnull, ‘Judicial review in the European Union’ in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 376. 
57 ECJ 23 April 1986, Case 294/83 EU:C:1986:166. 
58 ECJ 22 May 1990, Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council EU:C:1990:217. 
59 ECJ 27 September 1988, Case 302/87 Parliament v Council EU:C:1988:461. 
60 ECJ 16 May 1991, Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie v Council EU:C:1991:214. 
61 ECJ 18 May 1994, Case C-309/89 EU:C:1994:197. 
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decision and direct and individual concern under Article 173 EEC. Then there is the 
apparent absence of any legal basis for the requirement to show an interest in 
bringing proceedings, a requirement that is not mentioned in Article 263 and does 
not apply to privileged applicants.62 
These developments have made it very difficult for the Court of Justice to hide 
behind the wording of the Treaty when seeking to justify its decisions in this field. 
Following Codorniu, the case law seemed to have been stabilised, but an abrupt 
change of direction occurred in UPA.63 That case led to a Treaty change at Lisbon 
relaxing the standing rules applicable to private parties, but the relaxation was 
narrowly construed in Inuit.64 
Although the action for annulment is self-evidently more effective than the 
preliminary rulings procedure as a means of reviewing the validity of Union acts, in 
Inuit the Court of Justice continued the process of delegating responsibility for 
undertaking that task to the national courts. This may lead to at least the appearance 
of inconsistency. In Gauweiler and Others v Deutsche Bundestag,65 the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht sought guidance on the validity of certain decisions taken 
by the European Central Bank and set out in a press release. Although the decisions 
in question had yet to be implemented and this would not be possible until further 
legal acts had been adopted, the Court of Justice declared the reference admissible. 
The judgment followed the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, who observed 
that the alternative 
 
would entail the risk of excluding a significant number of decisions of the ECB 
from all judicial review merely on the ground that they have not been formally 
adopted and published in the Official Journal. If a measure does not need to 
be published officially in its standard form in order to produce effects — 
because it is enough to publicise it at a press conference or through a press 
release for it to have an impact outside the institution –, the system of acts 
62 See further K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis and K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford University Press 
2014) pp. 354-364. 
63 ECJ 25 July 2002, Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA) 
EU:C:2002:462. 
64 Supra n. 52. 
65 ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14 EU:C:2015:400. 
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and judicial review provided for in the Treaties could be seriously undermined 
if it were not possible to review the legality of that measure.66 
 
The validity of the decisions set out in the press release was upheld by the Court of 
Justice. 
The circumstances of the Gauweiler case were unusual in that it seems to 
have been the ECB’s intention in issuing the press release to produce an effect on 
the markets, a ruse which appears to have worked. However, one is entitled to ask 
whether the Court of Justice would have taken the same approach to admissibility 
had the issue arisen in annulment proceedings. 
One should not need to ask the question. It arises because in direct actions 
the Court of Justice and the General Court now sometimes seem content to collude 
with other institutions to evade the requirements laid down by the Treaty and deny 
applicants the right to an effective remedy. The Courts’ reluctance to engage directly 
in effective judicial review is no longer confined to cases brought by private 
applicants. Privileged applicants may also be caught in the net. Perhaps the cases 
concerned are outliers and do not presage the start of a new and unwelcome trend 
in the case law. But alarm bells are ringing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 ECJ 14 January 2015, Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón, EU:C:2015:7, para 89. 
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